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RETIRE AT YOUR OWN RISK: ERISA'S
RETURN ON INVESTMENT?
1974-The agony of years of frustrated and disappointed benefi-
ciaries has now come to an end. The discipline of law will enable
this and succeeding generations of workers to face their retire-
ment period with greater confidence and greater security.'
1993-[Clorporate America is losing its taste for the guaranteed
pension. In its place, companies are moving to plans that leave
workers responsible for paying part of the cost and managing
their own investments-and raise the prospect that those who
don't join up or who make poor choices will come up short in
retirement.2
In 1974, in response to pension funding failures and miscon-
duct by pension plan sponsors, Congress passed sweeping legisla-
tion to reform employee benefit plan formation and practices.
This legislation, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA), 4 had among its main purposes to ensure that nongov-
ernmental employees 5 with employer-sponsored pension plans
would receive promised pension funds.6
1 Francis X. Lilly, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 35 LAB. L.J.
603, 604 (1984) (quoting Senator Javits, primary sponsor of Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act ("ERISA"), after its passage in 1974).
2 Marc Levinson et al., Retirements at Risk, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1993, at 38.
3 See A.B.. SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW
16 (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS] (commenting
that almost one decade of studying private employer pension plan system preceded
passage of ERISA); Andrew H. Chen & Hyosuk Kang, Financial Implications of
ERISA.: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. ECON. & Bus. 193, 193 (1988) (noting that passage
of ERISA was major legislative development with great impact on private pensions).
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
5 "Governmental plans" are excluded from coverage under Title I of ERISA. 29
U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1988). The term "governmental plan" is defined at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(32) (1988).
6 See, e.g., EMPLOYEE BENEFITs, supra note 3, at 17; BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER
ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT 3 (2d ed. 1987).
ERISA protects the interests of the plan participant or beneficiary by creating
statutory enforcement rights. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). ERISA was
also intended to regulate the formation and operation of plans, § 1001(b), (c), to pro-
vide the government with enforcement powers, § 1132(a), and to establish federal
pension insurance for certain defined-benefit plans, §§ 1301-1323.
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In many ways ERISA has been dramatically successful: em-
ployees are vested earlier, pension discrimination is significantly
decreased, most pensions are adequately funded, and employees
are more knowledgeable about the nature of their benefit plans.7
Since the passage of ERISA, however, there has been a discernible
trend shifting the risk of accumulating sufficient retirement funds
to the employee.8 This trend is manifested in a decreased reliance
on employer-controlled defined-benefit plans and an increased us-
age of employee-controlled defined-contribution plans.9
Most private employer pension plans are covered under
ERISA.10 Broadly defined, pension plans are of two types: de-
fined-benefit plans and defined-contribution plans." In general, a
defined-benefit plan provides an employee with a specific benefit
expressed as an amount payable to the employee upon retire-
7 These changes have all been statutorily required. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053-1055
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); I.R.C. § 411 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring pension plans to
meet minimum standards for vesting of accrued benefits, based on employees' years of
service, to qualify for favorable tax treatment); I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1988) (regulating
discrimination in amount of benefits or contributions); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1988)
(establishing minimum funding standards for most private defined-benefit plans);
I.R.C. § 412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (same); 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (1988) (requiring
plan administrator, upon written request, to provide plan participants and benefi-
ciaries with plan documents); see also Leon E. Irish, Twenty Years of Employee Bene-
fits, J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 1, 10-12 (1992) (discussing effects of ERISA).
s See Levinson, supra note 2, at 38.
9 DOL Report will Highlight Ongoing Shift in Pension Plans, 20 Pens. & Ben.
Rep. (BNA) 2023 (Sept. 27, 1993), available in LEXIS, Penben Library [hereinafter
DOL Report] (citing Labor Department data indicating that between 1975 and 1990
number of participants in defined-contribution plans increased by over 300%, while
number of participants in defined-benefit plans decreased).
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988). "Pension plan" is defined as follows:
[Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereinafter estab-
lished or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding
circumstances such plan or program-(i) provides retirement income to em-
ployees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods ex-
tending to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of
the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits
from the plan.
Id.; see Hollingshead v. Burford Equip. Co., 747 F. Supp. 1421, 1427-28 (M.D. Ala.
1990) (holding that pension plans are covered under ERISA if acts that necessarily
evidence intent to form or maintain plan to provide specific benefits are established);
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that ERISA generally covers all pen-
sion and welfare funds established for employees by employer).
11 See, e.g., In re DeFoe Shipbuilding Co., 639 F.2d 311, 313-14 (6th Cir. 1981)
(holding that pension plan must be considered defined-benefit plan absent proof that
it is defined-contribution plan).
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ment.12 The benefit to be paid is frequently based on the em-
ployee's years of service and a percentage of compensation, 13 and
may account for the employee's expected social security income.14
A defined-contribution plan provides for an individual account in
which the actual benefit provided represents amounts contributed
by the employee or employer, plus investment earnings gained
thereon.'5
Prior to the passage of ERISA, defined-benefit plans were the
dominant form of pension coverage. 16 After its enactment, how-
ever, the number of defined-contribution plans substantially in-
creased, while the number of defined-benefit plans grew slightly or
remained stagnant.1 7 This shift reflects a number of factors af-
12 See COLEAN , supra note 6, at 17 ("A defined pension benefit plan promises a
fixed monthly benefit upon retirement."); see also Irish, supra note 7, at 15 (stating
that defined-benefit plan pays pensioner fixed monthly benefit for life).
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1988). ERISA interprets a defined-benefit plan as
any plan that does not meet the statutory definition of a defined-contribution plan.
Id.; see also COLEAN, supra note 6, at 17-18. ERISA does not set forth the formula-
tion of these factors necessary to determine the actual benefit. See id.
14 COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 34 ("In determining pension benefit or contribution
levels, employers have been permitted by the Tax Code to take into account an em-
ployee's Social Security benefit. The employer is given credit in effect for Social Se-
curity taxes paid for each worker. This practice is called integration.").
15 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988).
The term "individual account plan" or "defined contribution plan" means a
pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant
and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the partici-
pant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeit-
ures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such partici-
pant's account.
Id.; see also CoLE u , supra note 6, at 18; EMPLOYEE BENEFITs, supra note 3, at 77-
79. Defined-contribution plans include profit-sharing plans, which can have a discre-
tionary amount as the employer's annual contribution; money purchase plans, which
have a fixed annual contribution; employee stock ownership plans, under which the
employer contributes to the employee account and then invests the funds in company
stock; and savings and thrift plans such as individual retirement accounts and 401(k)
plans, in which the employee defers a portion of his salary to be contributed to an
account. Id. In most such plans, the funds will be transferred to the investments se-
lected by the employee. Id.
16 See Irish, supra note 7, at 2-5 (noting that rising numbers of private pensions
established before 1970 followed growth of labor movement, typically characterized by
large defined-benefit pension plans); see also ROBERT L. CLARK ET AL., DECLINING USE
OF DEFINED BENEFIT PLANs: Is FEDERAL REGULATION THE REASON? 1-2 (N. C. State
Univ., Dep't of Economics and Business, Faculty Working Paper No. 119, Apr. 1988)
(noting that prior to 1974 most workers with pension coverage were covered by de-
fined-benefit plans).
17 See Stephen H. Miller, Future of Employee Benefits Debated, J. AccT., May
1994, at 20 (examining potential demise of defined-benefit plans and projected reli-
ance on defined-contribution plans); DOL Report, supra note 9; Curtis Vosti, Panacea
19941
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fecting the relative attractiveness of these two types of pension
plans, including changes in the employment landscape, increasing
regulation, and differences in the maintenance costs of the
plans.'- The practical effect of this trend is to shift the burden of
providing adequate retirement income from the employer to the
employee.19
This Note examines the history and legislative intent under-
lying ERISA, the driving forces behind the trend toward defined-
contribution plans, and the potential problems this trend creates
for employees. It then examines the employer's fiduciary duty and
potential liability to employees covered by a defined-contribution
plan. Finally, it suggests some possible avenues for restoring the
protections originally intended as part of ERISA.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ERISA
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the regulation of private
pension plans was left mostly to employers, 20 with the federal gov-
or Problem Child; Questions Surround Popular Defined Contribution Plans, PENSIONS
& INvEsTMENTS, Apr. 1, 1991, at 23 (stating that defined-contribution plans "have
grown in recent years to become the focal point of employee benefit activity").
18 See infra notes 39-93 and accompanying text.
19 See Michael Tackett & Christopher Drew, Pension Funds Become Bonanza for
Companies, CHi. TRm., Dec. 4, 1989, at 1.
The difference [between defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans] is
important. Nearly two-thirds of the companies that terminated pension
plans started new retirement plans in the form of defined-contribution plans
instead of defined-benefit plans, the primary form of pension benefits for
more than a century.
In a defined-benefit plan, a company promises to pay an employee a cer-
tain amount of money for life when he or she retires. The company bears the
risk, and if the pension fund fails, the plans are guaranteed by the govern-
ment through the pension board.
In a defined-contribution plan, the company promises to put a certain
amount of money or stock in an account that the employee claims at retire-
ment in a lump sum.
Some of the risk of investment is shifted to the employee.
It may provide more money or stock for people immediately upon retire-
ment, but there is no government safety net for defined-contribution plans
and little recourse for someone working for a company that fails.
Id.
20 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITs, supra note 3, at 2. Prior to the 1947 passage of the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988), legisla-
tive involvement with private pensions was limited to tax incentives and qualifica-
tions. Id. at 2-3. The Taft-Hartley Act, and the 1962 Welfare and Pensions Plans Dis-
closure Act ("WPPDA7), Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 301-309 (1988)) (repealed by ERISA 1974), required pension plans to have joint
trustees representing management and labor. The laws required these trustees to re-
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ernment's involvement effectively limited to tax considerations.2 '
As a result, employees were left with little protection or recourse if
a pension plan failed to provide a promised benefit.22 This lack of
security was one of the driving forces behind the development of
ERISA, along with legislative concern regarding the adequacy of
retirement income.23
ERISA developed at a time when the American workforce had
shifted from an industrialized job base to a post-industrial job
base,24 and when private pensions had become extremely com-
mon.25 Prior to ERISA, the industrialized workforce, character-
port to the Department of Labor, but the statutes did not provide effective protection
or remedies for the employee. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 4-5.
21 See CoLEmiAN, supra note 6, at xi. Most of the pension regulation before the
passage of ERISA resulted from Internal Revenue Service rules, which allowed busi-
ness expense deductions for contributions to tax-qualified plans. Id. Under these
rules, tax-qualified plans were those that provided pension benefits for some employ-
ees, typically highly paid executives and officers. Id.
See also Irish, supra note 7, at 2. During and after World War II, high tax rates
associated with the war led employers to make greater contributions to qualified pen-
sion plans to receive the benefit of tax deductions. Id. At the same time, however, the
tax qualifications became stricter. Id.
22 See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643 (noting that employees were forced to rely on common law of
trusts to protect pensions and they could lose all or part of their benefits within days
of retirement, thus creating need for legislative reform).
23 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at lxvii (noting that two-thirds of Senate
and House Labor Committee members were from industrialized states with older, de-
clining industries and large unions, and that their chief concern was protecting their
constituents' retirement benefits).
24 See generally ROBERT J. LYNN, THE PENSION CRIsis 26-27 (1983).
A majority of employed Americans are now classified as white collar work-
ers. The upsurge in white collar work is attributable principally to greatly
increased numbers of people in services (health care, insurance, banking, fi-
nance, government, transportation, and hotel and restaurant work). Blue
collar employment is a proportionately less significant part of total employ-
ment than it was at the close of World War II, and its relative significance
continues to decline.
Id. at 26-27; see BUREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE
STATISTICS DERIVED FROi THE CuRRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 1948-87, 383-94 (1988)
[hereinafter LABOR FORCE STATISTICS]. The statistics indicate that the average
number of private wage and salary workers in finance, insurance, real estate, and
other services increased approximately 150% to 200% annually between 1948 and
1974, while the average number of private wage and salary workers in manufacturing
and goods production increased 15% to 30% annually during the same time period. Id.
25 See ROBERT L. CLARK & ANN A. McDERMED, THE CHOICE OF PENSION PLANS IN
A CHANGING REGULATORY ENviRomiENT 66 (1990) (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics report showing increase in pension coverage among private nonagricultural work-
ers from 4.1 million in 1940 to 18.7 million in 1960, a trend that continued over follow-
ing 15 years). The growth of private pensions after World War II is at least partly
1994]
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ized by large labor unions with defined-benefit pension plans, lob-
bied for increased security for their members with pension
coverage.26 This same group had lobbied for increases in the re-
tirement income provided by social security. Not coincidentally,
at approximately the time Congress enacted ERISA, social secur-
ity benefits were greatly increased.28 Increased social security
was intended to provide a floor for retirement income and was to
be supplemented by pension income. The proponents of ERISA en-
visioned retirement income as a "three-legged stool" supported by
pension income, social security, and personal savings.29
The broad objective of ERISA, as its name suggests, is the fi-
nancial security of retired employees.3 0 Specifically, ERISA has
four primary goals:31 to protect the interests of pension plan par-
attributable to employers' use of pensions to defer compensation, to avoid the price
fixing of that period, and to obtain tax deductions. Id. at 70-72. In addition, unionized
labor, which grew dramatically in the years after the depression, was successful in
establishing pensions as a subject for collective bargaining under the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947. Id. at 71; see also Irish, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that private pension cover-
age rose from 10% of all private wage earners in 1930s to 42% of private wage earners
in 1970).
26 See David Langer, Protector Becomes the Threat to Pensions, PENSIONS & IN-
VESTMENTS, Sept. 14, 1992, at 15. In 1964 two large unions in particular, the United
Auto Workers and the United Steelworkers of America, began lobbying heavily for
federal pension insurance. Id. at 16. Both unions represented weakening industries
and members with depleted or at-risk pension benefits. Id.
27 See W. ANDREw ACHENBAUM, SoCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS, 40-47
(1986) (noting that labor unions understood value of social security to their constitu-
encies and consistently supported amendments that would increase these benefits).
28 See Social Security Amendments Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-336, 86 Stat. 406
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (raising social security bene-
fits by 20% and establishing automatic cost of living adjustments for inflation).
29 See LYNN, supra note 24, at 41 ("Conventional wisdom holds that ideally, re-
tirement income should originate in three sources: social security, private pension
plans, and private savings (the three legged stool)."); Irish, supra note 7, at,6 ("Social
Security provides minimum benefits for all workers .... Private pension plans sup-
plement Social Security, at least for those who have meaningful coverage under them.
The third leg of the stool is private savings.").
30 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). Congress noted that despite the growth in pri-
vate pensions, "many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated
retirement benefits," and that it was "desirable in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries" that minimum standards be provided to insure the integrity and stabil-
ity of employee benefit plans. Id.; see also Lilly, supra note 1, at 603 (explaining Con-
gress's intent to "protect and enhance" retirement income); PENSION AND WELFARE
BENEFITS ASSOCIATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNow ABOUT THE
PENSION LAw 5 (1988) (stating that ERISA's rights and safeguards provide that
"money will be there to pay pension funds when they are due").
31 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 17.
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ticipants and their beneficiaries, 32 to protect employees and im-
prove pension plans through regulation of plan design and opera-
tion,3 3 to provide the government with the means to enforce
ERISA regulations,3 4 and to establish pension insurance to pro-
tect against defined-benefit plan failure. 5 In general, ERISA's
regulations were directed toward defined-benefit plans. Defined-
benefit plans comprised the majority of private pensions at the
time of ERISA's enactment3 6 and were subject to underfunding
and other abuses.3 7 Defined-contribution plans, in contrast, are
always fully funded (in the sense that the participant only has a
right to funds actually in the participant's account) and do not
promise a benefit, so they are essentially self-insured. Defined-
contribution plans, therefore, do not fall within ERISA's minimum
32 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 17. ERISA protects the rights of pension
and welfare plan participants by providing statutory enforcement rights and access to
the federal court system. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988) (authorizing participant or
beneficiary to bring civil action against administrator who fails to provide plan infor-
mation upon request in order to recover benefits due, to enforce rights, or to clarify
rights to future benefits under terms of plan); § 1132(a)(2) (empowering participant,
beneficiary, fiduciary, or Secretary of Labor to bring civil action for breach of fiduciary
duty).
33 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1114 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). ERISA's regulatory provi-
sions are contained in four parts. Part I covers reporting and disclosure requirements,
which are designed to improve pensions and protect employees by mandating disclo-
sure of certain plan information to the government, participants, and beneficiaries.
See §§ 1021-1031. Part II establishes minimum vesting requirements and minimum
participation standards, which are intended to lessen discrimination against lower-
level employees and broaden the coverage of pension plans. See §§ 1051-1061. Part III
sets minimum funding standards to improve the stability of certain defined-benefit
pension plans. See § 1081-1086. Part IV defines standards of conduct for pension plan
fiduciaries and prohibits certain transactions. See §§ 1101-1114.
34 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The administration and
enforcement provisions of ERISA empower the Secretary of Labor to bring civil ac-
tions to enforce the provisions of ERISA's Title I and to enjoin acts in violation of
these provisions. Id.
35 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Plan termination insurance
is provided through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"), a nonprofit
corporation organized within the Department of Labor, which has the power to insure
certain defined-benefit plans and to collect premiums from the covered plans. Id.
36 See CLARK T AL., supra note 16, at 1.
37 See COLEALAN, supra note 6, at xi ("The major impetus for the enactment of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was abuse and misman-
agement in the private pension system."); see also EMtPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 3,
at 362. One particular incident that helped prompt the passage of ERISA was the
closing of the Studebaker automotive plant in Indiana. Id. Underfunding of the Stu-
debaker defined-benefit pension plan relegated almost 7000 employees to receiving
15% or less of their anticipated pension benefits. Id.
1994]
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funding standards or require pension insurance for funding
protection. 8
II. CURRENT TREND IN PENSION PLANS
During the twentieth century, pension coverage of private
employees in America grew from ten percent in the 1930s, to
twenty-five percent in 1950, to more than fifty percent in 1984.19
Prior to the passage of ERISA, defined-benefit plans accounted for
nearly all of the growth in pensions.4 ° In recent years, however,
much of the growth in pensions has come from an increased
number of defined-contribution plans, while the number of de-
fined-benefit plans has slightly decreased.41 This trend, in vary-
ing degrees, appears to encompass all areas of American industry
and all pension plan sizes.42 During the most recent years for
which there are reliable data, the growth in private pensions ap-
38 See 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1988). The statute provides that PBGC coverage
does not extend to individual account plans. Id; accord Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 229-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
ERISA's termination insurance applies only to defined-benefit pension plans, and that
Congress exempted defined-contribution plans from pension insurance coverage since
they do not specify benefit); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S.
359, 363-64 n.5 (1980) (noting that ERISA's pension insurance does not apply to de-
fined-contribution plans because "by definition, there can never be an insufficiency of
funds" to pay participant benefits).
39 See CLARK ET AL., supra note 16, at 1.
40 CLARK ET AL., supra note 16, at 24, tbl. 3 (illustrating that defined-benefit plans
comprised approximately 77% of all plans existing in 1983 that were established prior
to ERISA's enactment).
41 See, e.g., Celia Silverman, Pension Evolution in a Changing Economy, EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INsT. SPECIAL REP. & Issue BRIEF, No. 141 (Sept. 1993). The
number of employees participating in defined-contribution plans between 1975 and
1989 increased by twenty-four million, while the number of employees participating
in defined-benefit plans increased by seven million between 1975 and 1983 and has
remained mostly stagnant since that time, with a slight decrease between 1989 and
1990. Id. at 8. Between 1975 and 1989, defined-contribution plans increased as a per-
centage of total qualified private pension plans from 67% to 82%. Id. During the same
period, the total number of participants in private defined-contribution plans rose
from 26% to 48% of all pension plan participants. Id. at 9, tbl. 2. From 1983 to 1989
there was an increase of 128,000 new plans. This number reflects an increase of
171,000 defined-contribution plans and a decrease of 43,000 defined-benefit plans. Id
42 See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 16, at 23, tbl. 2 (describing percentage in-
crease in primary defined-contribution plans and decrease in primary defined-benefit
plans among major industries between 1977 and 1983, including manufacturing, pro-
duction, wholesale and retail sales, services, and finance); Silverman, supra note 41,
at 12, tbl. 5 (illustrating that total number of defined benefit plans decreased for all
plan sizes except those with more than 5000 participants, with greatest number of
plan terminations occurring in plans with two to nine participants); id. at 13, tbl. 6
(indicating that total number of defined-contribution plans increased for all sizes of
[Vol. 68:527
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pears to have slowed or stopped, while the relative increase in de-
fined-contribution plans has continued.43
A Factors Contributing to the Trend
Analysis of the shift in the type of pension plans offered by
private employers does not reveal a singular cause for the trend.
Rather, there are a number of contributing factors, including in-
creased and frequently amended government regulations that im-
pact defined-benefit plans to a greater degree than defined-contri-
bution plans, increased costs to comply with the regulations,
growth in employment by small businesses which tend to favor
defined-contribution plans, and greater portability of defined-con-
tribution plans (which is better suited to an increasingly mobile
workforce).'
1. Government Regulation
The first of these factors, government regulation, including
ERISA and its numerous amendments, has focused primarily on
defined-benefit plans.4 5 In 1977, for example, Congress increased
the premiums to be paid to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo-
ration ("PBGC") by single employer defined-benefit pension
plans.4 6 In 1980, the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980 ("MPPAA") was passed, which makes it more difficult
plans, with greatest number of new plans occurring in plans with two to nine
participants).
43 See DOL Report, supra note 9. Based on the most recent data from Form 5500
submissions, which are mandatory for qualified plans under both ERISA and the In-
ternal Revenue Code, filings for defined-benefit plans decreased to 113,000 in 1990
from 132,000 in 1989, while filings for defined-contribution plans increased to 600,000
in 1990. Id. Assets contributed to defined-contribution plans in 1990 were more than
triple the assets contributed to defined-benefit plans. Id.
While usage of defined-contribution plans continues to increase, the percentage of
employees covered by a pension plan decreased in 1991 and 1992 by a few percentage
points. Id.
44 See CLARK & McDERMED, supra note 25, at 5.
45 See generally CLARK ET AL., supra note 16, at 1-2, 4 (reviewing post-ERISA
legislation and its impact on defined-benefit plans); Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the
Regulatory Impact of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 31 J.L. & ECON.
85, 87 (1988) (noting that ERISA's primary focus is defined-benefit plans); Private
Pension System is Stagnating Due to Legislative 'Tinkering' ACLI says, 20 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. 1131, 1132 (BNA), (May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Private Pension] (noting that
most legislative and regulatory changes since ERISA have been directed toward de-
fined-benefit plans).
46 29 U.S.C. § 1381. The amendment increased the premium to $2.60 per partici-
pant per year from $1.00 per participant per year. Id.
1994] 535
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for underfunded multi-employer defined-benefit plans to shift lia-
bility to the PBGC, and imposes liability upon employers for with-
drawing funds from such plans.47 Furthermore, the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA") 48 reduced the
maximum annual benefit available under defined-benefit plans,49
decreasing the ability to overfund a defined-benefit plan to com-
pensate for anticipated inflation.50
Regulation that disproportionately affected defined-benefit
plans continued over the ensuing years, rendering these plans less
attractive to employers. For example, the Retirement Equity Act
of 1984, which sought to insure that employees covered under de-
fined-benefit plans received promised benefits,5 1 reduced the age
for vesting eligibility, introduced break-in-service protections, and
liberalized survivorship rules for employee spouses.52 In 1986
Congress passed the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985 ("COBRA")53 to improve the financial health of the
PBGC. COBRA raised the pension insurance premium for de-
fined-benefit plans54 and minimized PBGC involvement in plan
terminations by creating two types of terminations for single em-
ployer defined-benefit pension plans: standard and distress termi-
nations.55 Also enacted in 1986, the Age Discrimination in Em-
47 Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94
Stat. 1208 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
48 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act ("TEFRA"), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
49 Id. TEFRA reduced the maximum annual benefit from the lesser of 100% of
compensation or $136,425 per year to the lesser of 100% of compensation or $90,000
per year. 96 Stat. at 505.
50 Id.; cf. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 3, at 10-11 (suggesting that TEFRA's
reforms reflected general attitude among congressional and executive branch mem-
bers that private pension plans were revenue losers for government and defined-bene-
fit plans were too favorable to wealthy).
51 Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
52 Id.
53 Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) ("COBRA") (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
54 Id. Under the Single-Employer Plan Termination Insurance Premiums portion
of COBRA, the pension insurance premium was raised to $8.50 per participant per
year from $2.60 per participant per year, in anticipation of PBGC deficit increases.
100 Stat. at 240-41.
55 Id. In "standard termination" cases, a single employer could terminate a fully
funded plan without PBGC involvement. 100 Stat. at 244-48. "Distress termina-
tions," which involve underfunded plans and necessitate PBGC indemnification, can
only be implemented in specific instances approved by the PBGC. Id. at 248-52.
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ployment Amendments of 1986 required employers to continue
accruing benefits for employees who worked past normal retire-
ment age. 6
In 1987, Congress determined that the amendments enacted
under COBRA to protect the financial stability of the PBGC were
insufficient. As a consequence, Congress passed the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 ("OBRA 1987")."7 This Act fur-
ther raised the pension insurance premium and introduced a vari-
able scale for premiums that required additional payments for un-
derfunded defined-benefit plans.58  Reflecting governmental
attempts to raise revenue, OBRA 1987 also increased the mini-
mum funding standards for defined-benefit plans, further re-
stricted company withdrawal of excess funds upon the termina-
tion of a defined-benefit plan, and placed limits on tax deductions
for overfunding defined-benefit plans.5 9 The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 ("OBRA 1990") again raised the pension
insurance premium and increased the excise tax penalty for rever-
sion of plan assets to employers. 60 The Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993 further reduced the maximum annual benefit for de-
fined-benefit plans.6 '
As the regulation of defined-benefit plans increased, federal
regulations impacting defined-contribution plans tended to be
more liberal.62 Legislation subsequent to the passage of ERISA,
as well as changes to the tax code, increased the attractiveness of
defined-contribution plans. For example, the Tax Reduction Act of
56 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592,
100 Stat. 3342 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621).
57 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat.
1330 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
58 See 101 Stat. at 1330-367 to -369. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987 raised the standard annual premium for pension insurance per participant from
$8.50 to $16, which, when combined with previous increases, resulted in a $13.40
increase in two years. In addition, underfunded plans could be required to pay as
much as $50 per participant per year.
59 101 Stat. at 1330-333 to -339, 1330-359 to -360, and 1330-331 to -333.
60 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388-562 and -573 (1990) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4980 and 29 U.S.C. § 1306).
The 1990 OBRA increased the pension insurance premium from $16 to $19 and raised
the excise tax penalty from 15% to 20%. Id.
61 See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 477
(codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (reducing maximum annual bene-
fit under defined-benefit plans to $118,000).
62 See generally CLAnK & McDRmD, supra note 25, at 80 (noting that changes to
tax code have created new options for companies to provide defined-contribution
plans).
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1975 gave a tax credit to employers for contributions to employee
stock option plans ("ESOPs"), a form of defined-contribution
plan." The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extended these tax credits to
employers who matched employee contributions. 4 The Revenue
Act of 1978 created simplified employee pensions and established
a new type of defined-contribution plan: the Internal Revenue
Code ("IRC") section 401(k) cash or deferred arrangement.65 The
introduction of IRC section 401(k) made employee contributions
tax deductible,66 thus changing the pension landscape by creating
an incentive to use employee funds as the basis of primary pension
plans.67
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA 1981") in-
creased both the availability of and the deductible contribution
limits of individual retirement accounts ("IRAs") and established
new tax benefits for employers offering ESOPs.68 In view of the
tax incentives created by ERTA 1981, congressional attention
turned away from legislation that broadened the attractiveness of
defined-contribution plans and safeguarded defined-benefit fund-
ing, and focused on legislation intended to raise federal revenue.6 9
In addition to reducing the maximum annual benefit for defined-
benefit plans, TEFRA reduced the maximum annual contribution
for defined-contribution plans.7 0  The Deficit Reduction Act of
63 Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of I.R.C.). This amendment created a form of Employee Stock
Ownership Plan ("ESOP") that entitled the company to a tax credit rather than a
deduction. Id. at 36-40.
64 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
65 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2785-96 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
66 See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Employee contributions to a 401(k)
plan, which would otherwise be taxable compensation, are excluded from current in-
come for federal income tax purposes. Id.
67 See Silverman, supra note 41, at 33 (noting that 401(k) plans provided first
opportunity for most private employees to make pre-tax contributions to retirement
funding); EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs, supra note 3, at 208.
68 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
69 See EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs, supra note 3, at 10 (suggesting that ERTA 1981 was
high point of government encouragement of private pensions, but that its tax reduc-
tions caused large budget deficits).
70 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (reducing maximum
annual contribution to 25% of earnings up to $30,000 from 25% of earnings up to
$45,475); 26 U.S.C. § 415 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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1984 maintained the maximum limits established by TEFRA.71
Finally, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ("OBRA
1989") increased civil penalties for breach of fiduciary duty and
limited certain deductions related to ESOPs. 7
2
Additional legislation impacted both defined-benefit and de-
fined-contribution plans.?3 As a whole, however, these regulations
placed increasingly greater burdens on defined-benefit plans.74
The enactment of ERISA in 1974 necessitated the revision of
many existing defined-benefit plans in order to maintain tax qual-
ified status and ensure that plans met the required levels of em-
71 See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.). The Deficit Reduction Act maintained the
limits on maximum annual contributions to defined-contribution plans, maintained
the limits on maximum annual benefit for defined-benefit plans, and significantly im-
pacted employee-welfare plans. Id.
72 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat.
2106, 2123 and 2346-54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
73 See, e.g., Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, 94 Stat. 3521
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 414). For example, this Act made it more difficult for
private employers to discriminate against lower-paid employees or provide pensions
that favored only highly compensated employees. 94 Stat. at 3526-27; see also Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (containing regulations designed to pre-
vent employers from directing plans in favor of the highly compensated).
In 1986, Congress reformed many of the Tax Code sections of ERISA with the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of I.R.C.). TRA limited contributions to 401(k) plans, established
two tiers of vesting for defined-benefit plans, reduced the availability of IRAs, and
imposed new taxes on distributions and early withdrawals from qualified pension
plans. 100 Stat. at 2411-14 (codified at I.R.C. § 219), 2446 (codified at I.R.C. § 411),
2459-61 (codified at I.R.C. § 401), and 2478-80 (codified at I.R.C. § 4980). In addition,
TRA attempted to reduce the incentive to terminate defined-benefit plans by imposing
an excise tax penalty on companies that recovered excess assets from plan termina-
tions because of overfunding under the ERISA standards. Id. at 2478-80 (codified at
I.R.C. § 4980).
74 See, e.g., CLARK & McDERAMED, supra note 25, at 106 (concluding that shift
away from defined-benefit plans results substantially from pension regulation follow-
ing ERISA); DOL Report, supra note 9, at 2023; Silverman, supra note 41, at 29 (stat-
ing that government legislation affected attractiveness of various defined-contribu-
tion plans to employers); Groups Debate Investments, Coverage, Retiree Benefits,
Rights of Participants, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 909 (June 1, 1992), available in LEXIS,
Penben Library, Pensn File [hereinafter Groups Debate] (stating that government
regulation has made defined-benefit plans particularly unattractive to small busi-
nesses, but does not account for shift by larger plans (citing Richard Ippolito, Chief
Economist with PBGC)). But cf. Reports of Defined Benefit Plan Decline Have Been
Exaggerated, DOL Official Says, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 994 (June 15, 1992), available
in LEXIS, Penben Library, Pensn File [hereinafter Reports] (suggesting that trend
toward defined-contribution plans is mainly due to growth of small businesses which
tend to favor these plans).
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ployee protection.75 In addition, because federal regulations
changed almost yearly between 1974 and 1990,76 pension plan ad-
ministrators were continuously required to keep informed of
amendments to the laws in order to evaluate the requirements for
tax qualified status and make any necessary changes to the plans
so as to avoid ERISA's civil penalties. Changes to a pension plan
typically involve the assistance of attorneys and actuaries; there-
fore, modifications increase the administrative cost for plan main-
tenance.7 7 The increased reporting requirement under ERISA
and subsequent amendments also raised the administrative costs
of pension plans.78 In addition, many employers must pay the
premium costs of the mandatory pension insurance associated
with defined-benefit plans. 79 The combination of these cost bur-
dens has led some employers to determine that defined-benefit
plans are not worth maintaining.8 0
These cost burdens have a greater impact on small employ-
ers-those with under one hundred employees-than on large
employers.81 Large employers normally incur a lower cost per
participant for plan administration, and the greater accumulated
75 See CLARK & McDERMED, supra note 25, at 79 (noting that "virtually all" ex-
isting defined-benefit plans had to be modified after ERISA, thereby limiting flexibil-
ity and scope of pension plans and reducing potential gains).
76 See supra notes 45-73 and accompanying text.
77 See CLARK & McDERMED, supra note 25, at 79-80 (noting that expense of pre-
paring new defined-benefit plans may incorporate some of costs of potential future
modifications in addition to increased administrative costs).
78 See CLARK & McDERMED, supra note 25, at 4, 79-80.
79 See supra notes 46, 54, 58, and 60 (noting increase in pension insurance pre-
mium between 1974 and 1990 from $1 per participant per year to $19 per participant
per year, and possibly up to $50 per participant per year for underfunded plans); see
also Charles D. Lockwood, Clinton Administration Introduces Pension Reform Legis-
lation, 9 J. CoMP. & BEN. 5, 20 (1994) (noting introduction of legislation that may
raise PBGC premiums even further).
80 See, e.g., Private Pension, supra note 45, at 1131 (stating that due to frequent
changes in pension laws, employers begin to feel that "cost benefit in terms of the
amount available for retirement savings purposes" is outweighed by "what they have
to do to make sure their plans comply with the law" (quoting Stephen Kraus, chief
counsel for American Council of Life Insurance)); Joel Chernoff, Crushed by the
Weight; 15 Years Later, Is ERISA Too Much of a Good Thing?, PENSIONS & INVEST-
MENT AGE, Sept. 4, 1989, at 1. The Chernoff article relates the comments of the chair-
man and chief executive officer of a retail chain in Michigan that terminated its de-
fined-benefit pension plan with assets of $2.3 million, calling the plan "too
burdensome and expensive," and leaving only a 401(k) plan for its 750 employees. Id.
The plan's termination was due to "the legislation (and regulations) subsequent to
[ERISA] that have made the whole arena of providing retirement benefits extremely
onerous." Id.
81 See Silverman, supra note 41, at 31.
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funds can earn a higher rate of return on investment.8 2 Addition-
ally, large employers may use defined-benefit plans to encourage
long-term employment. Since vesting requirements and benefit
accrual are weighted toward the later years of employment under
a defined-benefit plan, short-term employees tend to receive only a
fraction of their anticipated benefits when they leave employ-
ment.13 Large employers may prefer long-term employment be-
cause they often have high training costs and tend to provide more
opportunity for employees to move and advance within the com-
pany. 4 Unions, also typical sponsors of large defined-benefit
plans, similarly use defined-benefit plans as an incentive for con-
tinued union membership. 5
2. Shift Toward Smaller Employers
As the foregoing suggests, large employers will typically pre-
fer defined-benefit pension plans despite the greater cost. This
preference highlights another factor in the trend away from de-
fined-benefit plans-the shift in the American workforce from
large unionized manufacturing employers to small companies and
[I]n each year between 1981 and 1991, per participant administrative costs
for defined benefit plans, both one-time costs required for compliance and
ongoing costs, were higher for plans with fewer participants. In 1990, plans
with 15 participants experienced a per participant administrative cost of
$805.45, compared with the per participant cost of $161.73 for plans with
500 participants and the per participant cost of $55.50 for plans with 10,000
or more participants.
Id.
82 See CLARK ET AL., supra note 16, at 11.
83 See id. at 8-10; CLARK & McDERMED, supra note 25, at 50-52 (arguing that
weighting of defined-benefit plans results in reduced employee turnover); STEVEN G.
ALLEN ET AL., PENSIONS AND LiETzm JOBS: THE NEw INDUSTRIAL FEUDALISM REVIS-
ITED 7-9 (N. C. State Univ., Dep't of Economics and Business, Faculty Working Paper
No. 116, Jan. 1988) (noting correlation between vested pension rights and probability
of employee turnover); Silverman, supra note 41, at 23-25 (stating that employers
seeking long-term employees are more likely to offer defined-benefit plans because
slow rate of accrual in initial years and faster rate of accrual for employees with long
service tend to reward long tenures); Alan Stiteler, Retirement Plans: A Closeup Look
at What's New; Employee Benefits, PENSION WORLD, Sept. 1992, at 20 (indicating that
long-term employees are favored by defined-benefit plans).
84 See CLARK & McDERMED, supra note 25, at 32 (noting that company with high
training costs may use defined-benefit pension plan as part of "total compensation
package to try to keep its workers"); Silverman, supra note 41, at 28 (remarking that
some employers use defined-benefit plans to increase long-term service, which can
result in increased productivity and efficiency due to training and repetition).
85 See CLARK & McDERMED, supra note 25, at 93-95 (stating that union members
in given industry are 19% to 30% more likely to have a pension than non-members
and 8.4% more likely to have defined-benefit plan than defined-contribution plan).
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service firms. 86 Some estimates credit this shift in employment
demographics with responsibility for one-half of the trend from de-
fined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans, since small com-
panies and service firms which do offer a pension plan typically
offer defined-contribution plans.8 7  Decreased participation in de-
fined-benefit plans may also be attributable to the downsizing of
large industrial companies and the departure of employees from
large firms that offer such plans.88
3. Increased Mobility of American Workers
As the nature of the American workforce has changed, the
American worker has become more mobile.8 9 Estimates indicate
that typical American workers born after World War II will have
at least ten jobs over the course of their working lives.90 Workers
who do not remain at a single job for a long period are better
served by defined-contribution plans.9 ' An employee covered by a
86 See generally LABOR FORCE STATISTICS, supra note 24, at 383-94. Specifically,
private wage and salary employment in manufacturing decreased approximately 1%
between 1974 and 1987, while private wage and salary employment in finance and
other service industries increased between 80% and 90% during the same period. Id.
87 See Groups Debate, supra note 74 (crediting half of shift over last ten years to
"changes in employment from large, unionized firms in the manufacturing sector,
where defined benefit plans have dominated, to nonunion, service industry jobs in
smaller firms, where defined contribution plans have dominated" (quoting Richard
Ippolito, chief economist for PBGC)).
88 See, e.g., DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, PENSION SuBsTTruTION IN THE 1980s: WHY THE
SHIFT TowARD DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS? 17 (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Working Paper No. 3882, 1991) (finding that primary cause of shift
toward defined-contribution plans is declining number of participants in companies
with existing defined-benefit plans); Private Pension, supra note 45, at 1131 (noting
that shift in nation's industrial composition reduced workforce at many large compa-
nies and increased number of Americans employed by small service companies which
favor defined-contribution plans). But see CLARK ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 ("[Tihe
increased incidence of defined contribution plans is not due to changes in the indus-
trial structure of the economy or demographic characteristics of the workforce.").
89 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 83, at 1 (citing fact that "[e]ach month between 4
and 5 percent of all workers in manufacturing leave their jobs" as example of current
flexibility in American workforce, especially among younger employees).
90 See id. ("[Tihe typical American worker will eventually hold 10 jobs, 8 of them
by age 40."); Special Sponsored Section, Defined Contribution Plans, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Nov. 1991, at 131, 133 [hereinafter Special Section] (recognizing that em-
ployees no longer maintain one job throughout their lifetimes and that baby-boomers
average "'11 different jobs between leaving college and the end of their careers'")
(quoting Richard Garnitz of Lifespan Services, Inc.)).
91 See generally Silverman, supra note 41, at 14 (noting that young and mobile
employees can receive higher levels of retirement income with defined-contribution
plans if they make proper investment decisions); DOL Report, supra note 9, at 2023
(stating that flexibility of defined-contribution pension plans is helpful to more mobile
542
ERISA'S RETURN ON INVESTMENT?
defined-contribution plan is immediately vested in full for the
funds contributed and controls these funds after leaving employ-
ment.9 2 Employees can often roll these funds into a new defined-
contribution plan provided by a subsequent employer or into an
individual retirement account of their own.9" Thus, a young, mo-
bile employee may realize a greater return on pension funds with
a defined-contribution plan than with a defined-benefit plan be-
cause of the greater portability of defined-contribution plans.9 4
B. Impact of the Trend on Employees
This trend toward increased use of defined-contribution plans
has an important consequence: it shifts the burden of providing
sufficient retirement income to the employee.95 Under a defined-
benefit plan, a plan administrator, generally an investment pro-
fessional, will manage the plan's investments and shift funds
among investment options to compensate for inflation, market
fluctuations, and unexpected poor returns.96 Employees, however,
tend to think of the funds as savings and invest them in the safest
options, especially 401(k) and similar plans in which the employee
workforce "including women who take time out of the workforce... because of child
rearing responsibilities" (citing statement by Richard Hinz, chief economist and direc-
tor of research for Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration)).
92 See CLARK & McDERIED, supra note 25, at 9 (recognizing that because em-
ployee contributions to defined-contribution plans are always immediately vested in
full, employees always have unrestricted ownership).
93 See Michael J. Clowes, Investors at Brink of Turbulent Changes; Next Decade
Promises to Forever Put to Rest Business as Usual, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTs, Nov. 1,
1993, at 1 (indicating that employees regularly take defined-contribution plan account
balances with them when changing jobs).
94 See supra note 91.
95 See Silverman, supra note 41, at 14. "Concern over the increased prevalence of
defined contribution plans has arisen because these plans serve to shift the burden of
planning for retirement from employers to individuals and could result in reduced
retirement security for some individuals." Id. In general, with a defined-contribution
plan, employees bear the risk of inflation and suitable investment return, while an
employer bears these risks with defined-benefit plans. Id. at 26-27. See also Nancy
Van Gelder, Defined Contribution Upsurge Shifts Sponsor Obligation, PENSION
WORLD, July 1993, at 23, 25 (noting that trend toward defined-contribution plans
shifts responsibility for investment choices from plan sponsors to participants); Vosti,
supra note 17, at 25 (noting that employees are forced to become more sophisticated
about investing since their investment decisions will determine retirement income).
96 See EMpLOYEE B NEFITs, supra note 3, at 76 (noting that employers sponsoring
defined-benefit plans will base amount contributed on actuarial calculations of invest-
ment performance, as well as ERISA's minimum funding requirements).
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selects investments from a limited number of choices.9 7 In gen-
eral, employees have been drawn to low-risk investments, such as
guaranteed investment contracts ("GICs"), 98 typically among the
worst performers over time.99 Thus, if employees, who typically
lack financial or investment training, do not make good invest-
ment choices, the income waiting for them at retirement could be
much less than they anticipated. 10 0 Younger employees in partic-
ular will be hurt by this type of investing, since the compounding
of their returns over an extended period will typically be lower.10 1
97 See, e.g., Special Section, supra note 90, at 139 (observing that many plan par-
ticipants view themselves as savers rather than investors); DOL Report, supra note 9,
at 2023 (noting that participants tend to invest in overly conservative manner); ac-
cord Vosti, supra note 17, at 30 (suggesting that some plan participants will remain
adverse to any financial risk, even if educated about financial choices).
98 See April Klimey, From Savers to Investors: Encouraging a Change of Focus in
401(k) Plans, INSTITrrTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1993, at 1 (citing survey data indicating
that participants maintain more than 33% of their funds in guaranteed investment
contracts ("GICs") and additional 10% in other fixed-income investments); Archie B.
Spangler, A Disciplined Approach to 401(k)/404(c) Retirement Plan Administration,
PENSION WORLD, May 1993, at 18, 19 (estimating that 60% to 80% of total 401(k)
assets are invested in some form of guaranteed investment); Vosti, supra note 17, at
23 (noting that participant investment choices are predominantly in GICs, and that
surveys indicate 57% of participants would choose GICs over equities or other op-
tions); see also Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefits Plans,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Report of Interim Findings and Preliminary Conclusions of the
Defined Contribution Work Group 22-23 (1993) [hereinafter ADVISORY CoUNcIL]. The
Advisory Council intends to conduct a study in 1994 evaluating the way assets in
participant-directed defined-contribution plans are invested. Id. Among the issues to
be examined are the effect of the trend toward self-directed investments on benefit
levels, whether self-directed investments yield comparable returns to those provided
by trustee-directed investments, and the likely effect of the ERISA § 404(c) regula-
tions on benefit levels. Id.
99 See Fred Williams, GIC Type Funds are Suffering, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
May 16, 1994, at 3 (noting that many normally stable GICs lost value because of re-
cent sharp increase in interest rates); Spangler, supra note 98, at 19 (citing survey
data indicating that "such investments are among the worst performing asset classes
over time"); Janie Kass & Valerie Wise, Employee-Directed Investments: Viewing
Sponsor and Participant Involvement, PENSION WORLD, April 1993, at 14, 15 (estimat-
ing "that the one-year return net of inflation for small stocks will be between -33.16%
and +52.96%. For GICs, however, it will be 0% to +5%.").
100 See, e.g., Van Gelder, supra note 95, at 25 (noting that survey data indicate
that "most employees [participating] in defined-contribution plans vastly underesti-
mate the impact of inflation; [they] tend to put too much of their money in low-yield,
short term issues .... "); Defined Contributions Recordkeeping; Higher Standards in
Technology and Customer Service Transform 401(k) Recordkeeping, INSTITUTIONAL IN-
VESTOR, May 1992, at 10 [hereinafter Recordkeeping] (indicating that investors need
to be educated about including aggressive investments in their portfolios).
101 See Van Gelder, supra note 95, at 25 (suggesting that younger pension plan
participants require education "to become comfortable with the short-term fluctua-
ERISA'S RETURN ON INVESTMENT?
Another concern for future retirees is that the trend toward
defined-contribution plans may be eliminating one leg of the
"three-legged stool" envisioned by Congress when it established
ERISA.10 2 Personal savings decreased in the 1980s, and employ-
ees contributing to their own retirement plans may not see a need,
or have the discretionary income, for additional personal
savings. 10
3
Finally, the security of employees' retirement income is now
in question. In one sense, defined-contribution pension plans are
inherently more secure than defined-benefit plans because they
are always fully funded. 0 4 By self-directing the investment of the
funds, however, employees bear the risk of loss if the investment
should fail.10 5 Employees may fail to recognize, or not have the
time to evaluate, the financial indicators that an investment plan-
ner relies on before transferring funds between investments. For
example, the majority of self-directed pension plan investors
transferred funds to the stock market after it reached its high in
1987, and bailed out after the market crashed soon thereafter.10 6
Part of this problem may result from an employee's inability
to transfer funds rapidly between investment options. New regu-
lations promulgated under IRC section 404(c)' 0 7 allow employers
seeking to comply with the discretionary regulations to reduce
their potential for fiduciary liability if they provide employees
tions in stocks and to be confident that their savings will grow substantially by retire-
ment time").
102 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; Special Section, supra note 90, at
137 ("Financial planners like to refer to the three legged stool for retirement-pen-
sion, Social Security and personal savings. The 401(k) [plan] is the third leg of this
stool."); ADviSORY CouNcr., supra note 98, at 7 (stating that growth of 401(k) defined-
contribution plans is "effectively eliminating one leg of the three legged retirement
stool-that of employer-paid pension and profit sharing plans" (quoting M. Cindy
Hounsell, Esq.)).
103 See Private Pension, supra note 45, at 1131 (noting that favorable tax treat-
ment of pension plans would provide disposable income that could be used for per-
sonal savings).
104 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
105 See Silverman, supra note 41, at 20 (noting that poor investing by participants
can lead to decreased benefits, causing participants to retire with less benefits or con-
tinue working past normal retirement age to build additional retirement income).
106 See Spangler, supra note 98, at 19 (pointing out that 93.6% of investment re-
turn is associated with asset allocation decision).
107 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1992) (amending rules and regulations for fiduci-
ary responsibility under ERISA).
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with at least quarterly opportunities to transfer funds.'08
Although these regulations provide greater flexibility, quarterly
transfers may still not provide adequate access to funds in the
event of a market crash and may not protect an employee who
transfers investments out of the market after a crash. Some com-
panies offer more frequent transfer options;' 0 9 however, these op-
tions increase the administrative cost of a plan and do not protect
those employees who lack the expertise required to make sound
transfers.
C. Impact of the Trend on Employers
1. The Employer's Fiduciary Responsibilities
One of the cornerstones of ERISA's employee pension protec-
tion policy is the expansion of fiduciary responsibility and the reg-
ulation of fiduciaries' activities." 0 Under ERISA,
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control re-
specting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct
or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has
108 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(1) (1993). The regulation provides, in
pertinent part, that a plan may impose "reasonable restrictions on the frequency with
which participants and beneficiaries may give investment instructions" provided "[alt
least three of the investment alternatives made available... which constitute a broad
range of investment alternatives, permit participants and beneficiaries to give invest-
ment instructions no less frequently than once within any three month period." Id.
109 See Vosti, supra note 17, at 26, 28. For example, Hewlett-Packard Corp. is
instituting daily investment valuations and more frequent transfers for its employees
in order "to avoid the potential problems that surfaced immediately after the October
1987 market crash." Id. at 29. Administrators of defined-contribution plans also indi-
cate that daily transfers, although not likely to be used by all participants, provide
flexibility and added security to participants at little additional administrative cost.
Id. at 28, 29; accord Special Section, supra note 90, at 141 (quoting provider of 401(k)
mutual funds who suggested that plan administrators allow daily investment trans-
fers); Recordkeeping, supra note 100, at 10 (indicating that daily valuations, once rare
in pension plans, are becoming common).
110 See generally, H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639. The report by the Committee on Education and Labor indi-
cated that there were few federal standards applicable to fiduciaries. Id. at 4645-46.
See also H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4681 (noting that pension funds had been used and administered
improperly); S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4847 (finding conduct and administration of pension plans to be
area of concern).
546
ERISA'S RETURN ON INVESTMENT?
any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.
11 1
Courts have broadly interpreted this definition."- 2 Any exer-
cise of control over pension plan assets has been deemed to create
fiduciary status." 3 Plan assets must be held in trust for the ex-
clusive benefit of plan participants. Fiduciaries must follow trust
law, avoid proscribed conflicts of interest, 1 4 and comply with
ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements." 5 Although fidu-
ciary responsibilities provide substantial protection for defined-
Il 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988).
112 See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yampol, 840 F.2d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 1988)
(reflecting consistently broad construction of ERISA's definition of fiduciary duty);
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 126 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that ERISA's entire regula-
tory scheme indicates congressional concern with protecting participants and benefi-
ciaries, and thus should be interpreted broadly), aff'd, 858 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989); Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d
1255, 1259 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that annuity fund was "employee benefit plan"
and subject to ERISA's fiduciary requirements); Martin v. Walton, 773 F. Supp. 1524,
1526 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that fiduciary standards of conduct under ERISA "are to
be governed, interpreted and judicially determined both in light of the common law of
trusts, and the special nature, purpose and intent of employee benefit plans") (quoting
Donovan v. Mazzola, 2 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2115, 2133 (N.D. Calif. 1981),
aff'd, 716 F.2d. 1226 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984)); Buehler Ltd.
v. Home Life Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 1554, 1562 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting that courts
define term "fiduciary" broadly to effectuate Congressional intent of ERISA).
113 See, e.g., Fechter v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 800 F. Supp. 182, 197 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (holding that factual determination of defendant's possession or control of
decision-making authority, or both, is required to establish fiduciary duty).
114 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1992). A fiduciary must discharge
his duties:
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering
the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like charac-
ter and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provi-
sions of this subchapter or subchapter III of this chapter.
Id.; see also § 1106 (listing specific proscribed actions which would, if taken, constitute
breach of fiduciary duty).
115 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (containing ERISA's report-
ing and disclosure requirements). The provisions require that a summary plan de-
scription containing specific information be furnished to participants upon joining a
pension plan and at subsequent specified intervals. Id. § 1024(b). Annual reports
must also be provided to participants, id., and to the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 1024(a).
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benefit plan participants, who do not have control over the man-
ner in which pension funds are invested, defined-contribution plan
participants control where the assets of their individual accounts
are invested.1 16 Since courts have a broad range of remedies
available to them for breach of fiduciary duty,1 17 the question of
who has fiduciary status under a defined-contribution plan is
important.
ERISA specifically excludes employees who exercise control
over their own accounts from fiduciary responsibility to other par-
ticipants. Section 404(c) 11 provides as follows:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual ac-
counts and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise con-
trol over the assets in his account, if a participant or beneficiary
exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined
under regulations of the Secretary)-
(1) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a
fiduciary by reason of such exercise .... 119
If an employer is acting as a plan manager or administrator,
or has discretionary authority or discretionary control over plan
management, 120 the employer will undoubtedly have fiduciary ob-
ligations with respect to these functions. 121 Courts, however, have
Additionally, upon written request, plan administrators must provide participants
and other beneficiaries with a statement of the benefits accrued. See id. § 1024(b).
116 See supra note 15.
117 See, e.g., Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting that legis-
lative history behind ERISA indicates congressional intent to provide broad remedies
to participants and beneficiaries for fiduciary breaches); Marshall v. Snyder, 572 F.2d
894, 901 (2d Cir. 1978) (examining legislative intent to remove barriers to effective
enforcement of fiduciary duties).
118 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1988).
119 Id.
120 See Mitnik v. Cannon, 784 F. Supp. 1190, 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (noting that
fiduciary is one who has discretionary authority or control over management or dispo-
sition of funds), affd, 989 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1993).
121 See, e.g., Adams v. LTV Steel Mining Co., 936 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that under dual capacity doctrine employer can act as both employer and
plan fiduciary, but will be governed by ERISA's fiduciary standards only to extent
employer acts in fiduciary capacity), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 968 (1992); Payonk v.
HMW Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that "where an adminis-
trator of a plan decides matters required in plan administration or involving obliga-
tions imposed upon the administrator by the plan, the fiduciary duties imposed by
ERISA attach"); Amato v. Western Union Int'l Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir.
1985) (holding that employers "assume fiduciary status 'only when and to the extent'
that they function in their capacity as plan administrators, not when they conduct
business that is not regulated by ERISA7) (quoting Amato v. Western Union Int'l Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 963, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)) cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1167 (1986).
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held that an employer does not have fiduciary responsibilities
when the employer has no discretionary authority or control over
the pension plan, but merely serves a ministerial function.12
2
Congress recently promulgated regulations that interpret
ERISA section 404(c). 123 These regulations allow employers to
limit their potential fiduciary liability in certain cases involving
employee-directed defined-contribution plans.124  Compliance is
not mandatory;' 25 however, one can reasonably assume that most
employers will be agreeable to limiting their potential liability by
following the regulations.' 26 To comply, the employer must pro-
vide the participant or beneficiary with the opportunity to choose
from a broad range of investment alternatives, consisting of at
least three different categories, each category having materially
122 See Mitnik, 784 F. Supp. at 1193 (noting that merely ministerial role does not
trigger fiduciary duties); Kerns v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 790 F. Supp. 1456, 1460
(E.D. Mo. 1992) (noting that ERISA rejects ministerial functions as sufficient to cre-
ate fiduciary liability), affd, 992 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1993); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-
8 (1993) (providing that one who performs purely ministerial functions is not fiduci-
ary under Department of Labor regulations).
123 ERISA § 404(c) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1988)) provides:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and
permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his
account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his
account (as determined under regulations of the Secretary)-(1) such par-
ticipant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by reason of such
exercise, and (2) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under
this part for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such
participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
Id.
124 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1993). The new regulations provide guidelines for
determining whether a participant or beneficiary will be considered to have exercised
independent control: "[A] participant or beneficiary will be deemed to have exercised
control... [if] the participant or beneficiary was provided a reasonable opportunity to
give instructions with respect to such incidents of ownership." § 2550.404c-1(c)(1)(ii).
However, "[wihether a participant or beneficiary has exercised independent control in
fact with respect to a transaction depends on the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case." § 2550.404c-1(c)(2).
125 See Special Section, supra note 90, at 135 (noting that voluntary compliance
with 404(c) regulations limits employer liability). See generally 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-1 (1993). If an employer or other fiduciary fails to comply with the regula-
tions, the participant or beneficiary will not be considered to have exercised independ-
ent control, and the fiduciary exception will not apply. See id.
Whether a participant or beneficiary has exercised independent control is a fact-
specific inquiry. Id. § 2550.404c-1(c)(2).
126 See, e.g., Robert A. DiMeo & William A. Schneider, Common Sense Approach
Offered as a Way to Deal with Compliance of 404(c), PENSION WORLD, April 1993, at
22, 22 (suggesting that every plan sponsor would want to comply with § 404(c) regula-
tions); Special Section, supra note 90, at 135 (noting that many plan sponsors want to
comply to protect themselves from potential lawsuits).
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different risk factors and return characteristics. 127 The partici-
pant must have individual control over the assets128 and at least
quarterly opportunities to transfer plan funds.' 29 Lastly, the em-
ployer must provide participants with information regarding fees,
investment instructions and limitations, and copies of financial
data and prospectuses.' 30 If these requirements are met, the em-
ployer is relieved of fiduciary liability for any adverse financial
consequences of investments directed by the employee.' 3 ' Never-
theless, the employer and the plan fiduciary are still liable for any
other breach of fiduciary duty, such as the failure to execute the
instructions of the participant or lack of prudence in selecting in-
vestment options. 132 In summary, the regulations require that
each participant be given ample information and opportunity to
properly direct his or her investments before the employer will be
relieved of fiduciary responsibility for those investments. Because
courts typically construe ERISA's fiduciary duty broadly to protect
employees, it is uncertain how these regulations will be construed
in the context of shielding employers from liability. 133
127 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3) (1993). The regulations further require that
each of the alternatives be "diversified" and "in the aggregate enable the participant
or beneficiary by choosing among them to achieve a portfolio with aggregate risk and
return characteristics at any point within the range normally appropriate for the par-
ticipant or beneficiary." Id.
128 See supra note 124.
129 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(1) (1993) (requiring that "[alt least
three of the investment alternatives" permit "investment instructions no less fre-
quently than once within any three month period").
130 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(1) (1993) (listing information that must
be provided to participant or beneficiary).
131 See supra note 121; see also Arakelian v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 748 F.
Supp. 17, 22 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that employer with no control over administration
of its pension plan does not incur fiduciary liability for failing to monitor plan per-
formance). But cf. Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1104 (6th Cir.
1983) (holding that employer could sue as fiduciary of welfare plan because Congress
did not intend to prevent employers from assuming fiduciary powers and liabilities);
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 669 F.2d 124, 127 (3d
Cir. 1982) (recognizing legislative presupposition that employer sponsors would fre-
quently be fiduciaries).
132 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1993) (failing to extend fiduciary exemption be-
yond provisions related to employee-directed investments); see also Leigh v. Engle,
727 F.2d 113, 133 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that under ERISA one may have fiduciary
status for certain activities but not for other activities), aff'd, 858 F.2d 361 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
133 See supra note 117.
ERISA'S RETURN ON INVESTMENT?
2. The Role of Investment Advisors
An investment advisor who suggests investment alternatives
for a pension plan has a definite fiduciary duty to select alterna-
tives prudently.13 4 In addition, if an employer provides invest-
ment instructions to employees in order to comply with ERISA
section 404(c) regulations, 35 the employer may be considered a
fiduciary. Similarly, an investment advisor who is hired by an
employer to provide investment instructions to employees is a fi-
duciary under the terms of ERISA if the advisor is compensated
for services rendered. 1
3 6
The Department of Labor defines investment advice as gui-
dance that goes to the value of securities or other property under a
plan, or recommendations regarding investment in such property
or securities. 137 Whether a party that provides investment in-
structions will avoid liability for breach of fiduciary duty under
the section 404(c) regulations will likely depend on the specificity
of the instructions given. Employers may be fearful of giving de-
tailed instructions to employees and thereby creating fiduciary
status. If, for example, the advice is general in nature, discussing
types of investments and various ways to invest, it is possible that
the instructing party will not be exposed to fiduciary liability for
the employee's investments.'38 Once specific investments are rec-
134 See GIW Indus. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729,
731-32 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that investment advisor must make thorough investi-
gation of investments with regard to specific plan requirements to satisfy prudent
man standard imposed upon ERISA fiduciaries); DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y of United Sates, 720 F. Supp. 1342, 1346-47 (N.D. Il1. 1989) (finding fiduci-
ary duty to examine investments and diversify them, and to use care, skill, and pru-
dence in selecting investments), aff'd, 920 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1990); Ann L. Combs,
Pension Trends, 18 REc. Soc'y OF ACTUARIEs 1839, 1842 (1992) (noting that "[slection
404(c) never relieves fiduciaries, however, from their liability in selecting the invest-
ment alternatives"); see also Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that, under ERISA, proper standard to examine fiduciary's action is prudent
person rule), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
135 See, e.g., Van Gelder, supra note 95, at 23 (noting that employees may be un-
able to exercise independent control over investments if they do not have requisite
knowledge); DiMeo & Schneider, supra note 126, at 22-23 (explaining importance of
offering enough alternatives for diversification without confusing participant).
136 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988).
137 See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (1993).
138 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1993); see also Schloegel v. Boswell, 994 F.2d 266,
272 (5th Cir.) (holding that consultanfs investment proposal was not effective control
and did not give rise to fiduciary responsibility), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 440 (1993).
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ommended, however, the instructing party is likely to be deemed a
fiduciary with regard to these investments. 13 9
3. The Employer's Other Considerations
A final consideration for employers resulting from the shift to
defined-contribution plans is the ability to encourage long-term
employment. 140 Studies show that defined-benefit plans tend to
attract and encourage long-term employees, while defined-contri-
bution plans tend to attract and encourage mobile employees.141
Defined-benefit plans also accord the employer a greater degree of
control over an employee's length of service and retirement age,
while defined-contribution plans do not.'42  Since the
demographics of the American workforce indicate a continuing
shift toward more mobile employees, 43 it is uncertain what long-
term impact, if any, the trend toward defined-contribution plans
will have upon length of service.
III. SUGGESTED MEASURES FOR RESPONDING TO THE CURRENT
TREND
One aspect in which the trend toward defined-contribution plans
potentially diminishes employee protections involves diversifica-
tion of investment. ERISA requires plan trustees to diversify "the
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
so."144 For defined-benefit plans, diversification is crucial to act-
ing prudently and avoiding liability for breach of fiduciary duty.' 45
139 See, e.g., Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 957 F.2d 622, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that fiduciary status could be imposed upon account broker giving invest-
ment advice which he had reason to know was being used as primary basis for invest-
ment decisions); Fetcher v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 800 F. Supp. 182, 204 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (noting that professionals are ERISA fiduciaries if they assume manage-
ment or administrative responsibilities, but merely giving professional advice does
not create fiduciary status); see also Van Gelder, supra note 95, at 25 (suggesting
distinction between investment education with no fiduciary responsibility and invest-
ment direction that would create fiduciary obligations).
140 See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
141 See Silverman, supra note 41, at 23.
142 Silverman, supra note 41, at 22 (noting that "employers often find it highly
desirable to be able to reduce their workforce on a voluntary basis" with early retire-
ment programs "by offering incentives through a defined benefit pension plan").
143 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
144 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1988).
145 See, e.g., Brock v. Citizens Bank, 841 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir.) (holding that
investment of over 65% of plan assets in commercial real estate, absent showing that
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In contrast, while self-directed defined-contribution plans must
provide a "broad range of investment alternatives,"146 no mini-
mum diversification of actual investments is required. 147 For ex-
ample, a pension plan trustee who invested fifty percent or more
of the assets of a plan, other than an ESOP, into a single com-
pany's stock would be liable for breach of fiduciary duty if the in-
vestment failed.' 48 An employee who invested fifty percent or one
hundred percent of his or her self-directed assets in one company's
stock,' 49 however, would likely have no recourse if the company
failed. It is submitted that for this reason employees with defined-
contribution pension plan coverage, especially those with little or
no financial acumen, would benefit from some type of mandatory
minimum diversification requirement. This requirement could be
tailored to suit different employment situations and varying levels
of financial sophistication among employees.
A second area in which participants in defined-contribution
plans lack the protection envisioned by ERISA is pension plan in-
surance. The PBGC provides insurance against the termination
of defined-benefit plans that lack sufficient funds to pay pension
liabilities. 50 No such protection is currently provided for defined-
contribution plans, however, since they are fully funded.' 5 ' Thus,
the beneficiary of a defined-benefit plan that was underfunded at
termination because of a collapse in the market would receive
investment was prudent, violated diversification requirements of § 1104(a)(1)(c) and
constituted fiduciary breach), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988); Marshall v. Glass/
Metal Ass'n & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Haw.
1980) (placing burden on defendant to show that failure to diversify did not create
risk of large losses to pension plan). The Marshall court held that a commitment of
23% of the total plan assets to a single loan subjected a disproportionate amount of
the plan assets to the risk of a large loss, and that the defendant's burden "is not
merely to prove that the investment is prudent, but that there is no risk of large loss
resulting from the non-diversification." Id.
146 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. Since an employee who controls
the assets in his or her account is not a fiduciary, the duty of prudence and the associ-
ated requirement of diversification do not apply. See supra note 136.
148 Cf. Marshall, 507 F. Supp. at 384 (holding that subjecting 23% of plan assets
to single loan created too large a risk of loss).
149 See Beyond First Executive, PENSIONS & INvEsTMENTs, April 29, 1991, at 12,
12 [hereinafter Beyond First] (noting that when employer securities are investment
option, employees normally invest between 20% and 50% of their account assets in
stock).
15o See supra note 35.
151 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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PBGC coverage, 152 while a defined-contribution plan beneficiary
in a similar circumstance would not. It is submitted that requir-
ing some minimum level of insurance for defined-contribution
plans, such as insuring a percentage of account principal, would
better protect the participants and beneficiaries of these plans. 153
Two important considerations must be addressed in order for this
insurance to be provided. First, in order to have sufficient funds
to guarantee these plans, PBGC funding would have to be in-
creased,15 4 probably by assessing a premium on defined-contribu-
tion plans. Such a premium, however, might also create a disin-
centive for instituting defined-contribution plans and reduce
overall pension coverage. Second, insuring the principal might
encourage speculative investing by employees who are not risk-
averse, and could result in multiple payouts if employees repeat-
edly lost principal in high risk investments. Some type of mini-
mum diversification, as discussed above, would probably be a suf-
ficient deterrent to prevent these effects.
Educating participants in defined-contribution plans may
help provide the security that retirement funds require. The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission has proposed new disclosure
requirements that mirror those of the Securities Exchange Act of
1933 by requiring employers to provide investment prospectuses
and shareholder reports to plan participants.'5 5 But to some ex-
tent, increased disclosure was a part of the new section 404(c) reg-
ulations, 151 and questions have been raised about the effective-
ness of this type of disclosure. 157
152 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (establishing pa-
rameters of ERISA plan termination insurance).
153 See Beyond First, supra note 149, at 12 (noting that Xerox Corp., in recogni-
tion of this risk, recently revised its defined-contribution program to guaranty mini-
mum benefits).
154 See SUBcoMM. ON OvERslc rr, HOUSE ComMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PENSION BENE-
FIT GUARANTEE PROGRAM 18-19 (Comm. Print 1993) (noting that PBGC faces increas-
ing deficit and may require additional premiums to remain solvent with respect to
defined-benefit plans).
155 See Employees Lack Expertise Needed to Invest for Retirement, Beese Says, 20
Pens. Rep. (BNA) 702 (Mar. 29, 1993) (stating that SEC will propose legislation man-
dating that employees be provided with investment prospectuses and shareholder re-
ports to better educate employees and help employers avoid possible lawsuits (citing
Securities and Exchange Commissioner J. Carter Beese)).
156 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
157 See Julie Rohrer, The SEC Means Well, But.... , INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Aug. 1992, at 117 (questioning need to replace prospectuses already being provided by
banks and insurers with those required by SEC).
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Pension simplification may be an alternative answer, and sev-
eral legislative attempts have in fact been submitted to streamline
the mass of regulations involving employee benefit plans. To be
effective in simplifying the use of defined-benefit plans, the pro-
posals must provide the means to reduce the cost and complexity
of sponsoring these plans,-15 and probably would need to offer pro-
spective participants new tax incentives for their use.15 9 In past
years a number of pension simplification bills have been intro-
duced in Congress, some of which are still pending. 60
In some ways the private pension marketplace appears to be
adapting to the shift to defined-contribution plans. Hybrid plans
combining aspects of defined-benefit and defined-contribution
plans have begun to appear in pension planning.'6, One example
is the cash balance plan, which establishes phantom accounts for
each participant, though assets are actually pooled as in a defined-
benefit plan. The phantom accounts are credited each year with a
guaranteed return.' 62
CONCLUSION
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA in an effort to insure that
employees retire with some measure of pension security. Since
then, an unexpected shift in the private pension arena-the trend
away from defined-benefit pension plans toward the increased use
of defined-contribution plans-has put employees in a precarious
158 See Pension System Will Remain Healthy, 7 Ben. Today (BNA) 260 (Aug. 10,
1990), available in LEXIS, Penben Library, Benday File (suggesting that companies
avoid involvement in pensions, "'not because they really don't want to [be involved],
but simply because its too complicated to comply and too complicated to understand'"
(quoting Howard Weizman, executive director of Ass'n of Private Pension & Welfare
Plans)).
159 See generally Mark Fortune, A Doomed Effort, INSTrUTmNAL INVEsTOR, Dec.
1991, at 165 (noting that no existing pension simplification proposal contains tax in-
centives to start new plans; therefore, these proposals have not been well received by
small business community).
160 See, e.g., H.R 2641, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Employee Benefits Simplifica-
tion Act); H.R. S. 762, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Pension Simplification Act).
161 See Fran Hawthorne, Why Designer Pensions are in Fashion, INsTrmI ONAL
INVESTOR, June 1992, at 123 (noting "astounding" growth of hybrid plans that com-
bine aspects of defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans, including cash-balance
plans, age-weighted profit-sharing plans, target benefit plans, floor-offset plans, and
other variations).
162 Id. at 124. The goals of cash balance plans include evening "out the accrual of
benefits so that more money can be directed toward younger or short-term workers
who move on long before retirement and to make the benefits comprehensible to plan
participants." Id.
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position once again. Accompanying this change in pension plan
availability is a shift in the risk of investing retirement funds.
Employers, who bear the risks of poor investments when promis-
ing a retirement benefit, have little or no risk when employees
self-direct their funds in a defined-contribution plan. Also, in de-
fined-contribution plans, employees do not enjoy the advantages of
professional investment management or PBGC insurance of their
pension funds, but the employee may benefit from the greater
portability of defined-contribution plans. The trend toward de-
fined-contribution plans is a result of many causes, including fre-
quent regulatory changes, cost differentials between plan types,
and increased mobility in the workforce. It is unlikely, therefore,
that any one action can completely reverse the trend currently
taking place in the market. Steps can be taken, however, to in-
sure that adequate retirement funds are available for future retir-
ees, and hopefully a new pension crisis can be avoided.
John R. Keville
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